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by 
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Nearly every potted histoxy of South Africa begins with the observation that the 
initial purpose of white settlement in the region was to provide a source of fresh 
provisions to the ships of the Dutch East India Company. It is also generally agreed 
that, owing to a combination of factors, such as the nature of shipping demand, the 
price of grain in Ebmpe and Batavia, the inferior quality of Cape wines, the aridity 
of the Cape hinterland and the difficulties of transport (l), the prime importance of 
the Cape to East Indian commerce, apart from its strategic position, lay in its role 
as a supplier of meat. But what is now under dispute is the extent to which the 
market for meat and other pastoral products conditioned the expansion and social 
organization of white settlement in the interior of the Colony. 
S. D. Neumark has argued that there was a direct relationship between the 
pace of colonial expansion and the fluctuations in shipping demand at the Cape, and 
hence, by implication, that the settler economy was highly responsive to market 
forces. (2) Leonard Guelke, by contrast, argues that frontier expansion depended on 
demographic pressure rather than on market demand, that market forces were weak in 
the interior (g), and that this, combined with the ready availability of land, created 
an egalitarian and homogeneous settler comm~ty. (4) 
Clearly an analysis of the background to the Khoikhoi rebellion of 1799 will 
be seriously lacking unless the questions raised by this debate are answered, for the 
rebels were servants of stock-farmers on the eastern frontier; but I would contend 
that an answer adequate to this specific purpose must await a detailed exsunination of 
the economies of individual farms and farming localities in the region concerned, such 
as has not yet been attempted. Pending the attempt, it must suffice to say that the 
market for livestock and other pastoral products (and products of the hunt) was an 
ever-present factor in the frontier econony and that, while it may not have been a 
sufficient cause of expansion, it did affect "the w w  in which men, women and children 
were set to workf1. (5) 
During the first 40 to 50 years of the Colony's existence, the bulk of the 
Company's livestock requirements were met by the Khoikhoi of the western Cape. The 
Companps initial intention was that the free bw&ers should supply arable products 
rather than livestock: it is well known that cattle barter between burghers and 
Khoikhoi was strictly prohibited. However, the exchange between Company and Xhoikhoi, 
which became overtly coercive in the later years of the 17th century and which was 
accompanied by direct intervention in Khoikhoi politics, initiated a process of 
economic decline which eventually reduced the western Cape Khoikhoi to poverty and 
permanent dependence on the Colony. (6) The official trade in itself was not of 
sufficient magnitude, in relation to the size of Khoikhoi herds, to bring about 
irrevocable impoverishment (7), but the official trade was supplemented by the seizure 
of cattle and sheep as tribute or booty in war, and, by the late 1680s and 16908, by 
an escalation in illegal trading and robbery on the part of freemen. (8) The impact 
of this increasing drain of livestock was the greater because cattle and sheep in 
Khoikhoi society were owned by families and individuals, not by the community as a 
whole. (9) The loss of breeding stock could have very serious consequences for a 
family with a small herd, and political disintegration made it difficult to recoup 
stock losses in battle. 
Against this background of Khoikhoi impoverishment the Company opened the 
stock trade to freemen (in 1700) and, for the first time, allowed the expansion of 
white settlement into the hinterland north of Drakenstein. (10) Thus was the moving 
white cattle frontier encouraged and given sanction. Thenceforth, Khoikhoi in the 
line of the graziers' advance were to suffer from dispossession of their pastures and 
watering places and loss of their stock on a scale unknown in the 17th century. Under 
these condition, the boundaries between Khoikhoi herders and San or Sonqua hunter- 
gatherers, which had always been flexible (11) , became s till more blurred. Some 
impoverished Khoikhoi or "Xhoisan" waged drawn-out guerilla campaigns against the 
invading settlers (12); others retreated inland with their herds; but many became 
employees or, more rarely, labour tenants, on white-owned farms. 
It could be argued that the Company's acquiescence in the displacement of 
its Xhoikhoi suppliers by white graziers involved more than capitulation to the 
importunities of the free burghers - that it implied a tacit recognition of differences 
in the modes of production of Khoikhoi communities, on the one hand, and Boers, on 
the other, and a realization that the latter were better equipped than the former to 
aid the Company in its pursuit of commercial gain. Kate Crehan has made a thorough 
and perceptive analysis of these differences, which can only be briefly summarized 
here. (13) First, she has shown that, in the early stages of colonization, Boer 
social units were dependent upon commodities acquired through exchange (on the 
monetized market of Cape  own) to an extent which the Khoikhoi were not. (14) Boer 
herds were thus regarded by their owners as repositories of exchange value, thou& 
they also served as use-values in domestic consumption. For the Khoikhoi, livestock 
were first and foremost use-values, though some were exchanged against other goods. 
Second, she has shown how the institution of private land ownership in Boer society 
allowed for its division into a class of land-owning non-labourers, on the one hand, 
and landless labourers, on the other. (15) On the basis of this division, she 
argues, the colonists were able to appropriate a tradeable s&lus of livestock on a 
scale which was impossible in Xhoikhoi communities where land was communally owned.(l6) 
Nevertheless, these differences in the mode of production of the two groups 
cannot be used to explain the process of displacement and subjugation of the one by 
the other, under the aegis of merchant capital. Such an explanation would involve an 
unjustifiably static approach to modes of production. In the first place, while 
Khoikhoi dependence on commodities may have been sligbt in the 17th century, it 
increased with time: 18th century travellers and the colonists themselves exchanged 
a variety of manufactured goods against cattle (17); Khoikhoi illegally bartered 
horses from the colonists after this was prohibited. Indeed, by the 18th 
century the limited range of goods exchanged for Khoikhoi livestock in the official 
trade was a reflection of the Company's avarice as well as the wants of the Khoikhoi. 
Secondly, one cannot assume that the relations of production in Khoikhoi society were 
destined to inflexibility in the fac;e of market forces. Even within the "traditional" 
scheme of things individuals were able to accumulate large herds: Klaas and Koopman, 
17th century Chainouqua Captains, did so as middle men for the Company (18); Scipio 
of the Peninsulars had more than 200 cows and 2,000 sheep in 1712. (19) As 'the 
colonists advanced, pushing the Khoikhoi from their lands, opportunities for the 
development of social differentiation within Khoikhoi society were inevitably 
curtailed, but they emerged and were utilized in the frontier communities of the 
Kamiesberg and Transorangia. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that the class divisions characteristic 
of Boer society were not given, but made. The colonists~ assertion of private control 
over land and hence over the labour of its inhabitants was the product of constant 
struggle between themselves and the indigenous people. It has been remarked that 
this struggle was less violent than in similar situations elsewhere (20), because of 
the mobility and low density of Xhoikhoi and San populations and the fragmentation of 
Khoikhoi leadership in the face of manifold pressures. However, while military 
resistance to colonization was confined to border areas until the eastern rebellion 
of 1799, Xhoikhoi resistance to proletarianization took other less dramatic forms, 
such as stock theft, desertion and migration, the effect of which was the 
bewildering variety of social relations in frontier areas. In the last resort, 
however, force was the guarantor of colonial social relations. Whatever the 
historian's judgment, there was no doubt that in the eastern Cape at the turn of the 
18th century this was how both colonists and Khoikhoi had come to see their 
situation. The eastern rebellion came after more than 30 years of interaction 
between whites and Xhoikhoi i n  the lands east of the Gamtoos River and south of the 
Sneeuwbergen. What follows is an account of these years. 
Neumark has argued that the number of foreign ships calling at the Cape 
was particularly important in stimulating the expansion of settlement, since the meat 
contractors were allowed to supply them at prices higher than those set by the 
Compq. (21) The late 1760s saw the beginning of an unprecedented rise in the 
number of foreign ships (see Appendix I), and it would seem likely that the rapid 
eastwards expansion of white settlement along the south-east coast beyond the Gamtoos 
River and along the mountains bordering the Great Karroo into the plains of Camdebo 
and the Sneeuwberg range was stimulated thereby; though Guelke has shown that a 
marked iacrease in the annual number of loan-places issued occurred in the 1 7 6 0 ~ ~  
before the shipping bo'om began. (22) 
In 1770 the south-eastern boundary of the Colony was moved to the Gamtoos 
river, but by this time a number of colonists had begun to graze their cattle in the 
exceptionally rich pastures between the Gamtoos and the Zwartkops rivers. Among them 
was Sebastiaan van Reenen of Cape Town, 'lone of the richest and most progressive 
burghers in the Colonyff (23), who kept cattle at the Loerie river in the charge of 
Khoikhoi. (24) Jacob Kok of Swellendam, another "progressive"fmer, was pasturing his 
cattle on van Stadens river and Jacobus Scheepers had land on the Gamtoos river some 
tine before it became the official boundary. (25) Not long after, Gerrit Scheepers 
and a number of others took advantage of the Stellenbosch authorities' confused 
knowledge of the geography of their vast domain and established themselves legally on 
the Zwartkops river. (26) 
In March 1775 the white inhabitants of Swellendam petitioned the Company 
to extend the eastern boundary once more. They wrote that 
unless they can procure more pasture than is to be founc? 
in the present confined limits their prosperLty will 
suffer a severe shock, and the revenues of this Colony ... 
instead of increasing will be still further diminished. 
Not content with the coastal lands between the Gamtoos and Bushmans rivers, which 
they dismissed as too dry and heavily wooded and on that account not capable of 
forming more than 20 farms, the petitioners asked that Agter Bruyntjes Hoogte, 
"being nearly all good useful pasture landn, be included as well. (27) Perhaps 
swayed by the allusion to its budgetary deficit, the government moved with surprising 
alacrity and in November 1775 proclaimed the Bushmans River to the south and the 
Great Fish River to the north as the eastern boundary of the Colony. By 1779 there 
were at least 22 white families settled between the Zwartkops and Bushmans rivers, 
among them the three Ferreiras, Stephanus, Solomon and Pieter Hendrik, living near 
the shores of Algoa Bq. (28) In that year began the first clashes between them and 
the Zuurveld Xhosa, and by September most had fled with their livestock to the 
Zwartkops . 
The movement of colonists into the Camdebo and Sneeuwbergen began in the 
late 1760s. (29) By 1774 they had spread eastwards of Camdebo as far as Agter 
Bruyntjes Hoogte. By 1778 there were upwards of 33 settler families in Camdebo and 
Bruyntjes Hoogte alone. (30) The Sneeuwbergen, Bruyntjes Hoogte and the lands behind 
were exceptionally well suited for the raising of livestock. Barmw described the 
Sneeuwbergen in 1799 as Ifthe grand nursery of sheep and cattle, particulazly of the 
former", and Bruyntjes Hoogte as "the best division in the whole district for horses 
and horned cattle" and equal to the Sneeuwbergen in the quality of its mutton. (31) 
Thou& the new settlers1 flocks and herds were small in the early 1770s (32), it was 
perhaps with an eye to the prospects of this region in zylation to expanding shipping 
demand that Governor van Plettenberg confirmed its annexation in 1778, saying that it 
"would contribute much to the general advantage of this Colony, by rearing cattle and 
producing butterw. (33) 
The areas into which the colonists had moved had been Xhoikhoi lands for 
many centuries. The first written accounts of Khoikhoi settlement in the eastern Cape 
date from the 17th century, but linguistic and archaeological evidence suggests that 
they had occupied the Ciskei since pre-Nguni times. (34) In 1689 Ensign Isaq Schry-ver 
named five tribes living south-east of the powerful Inqua. Furthest to the east were 
the Gonaqua, from whom the Inqua bartered dagga. (35) In 1702 the Gonaqua were again 
visited by Dutch emissaries, who obtained from them 1,800 cattle and 3,000 sheep. (36) 
Using the oral evidence transmitted by John Box Bokwe to Alfred Kropf in 
the late 18th century, Harinck has pieced together the early history of the Gonaqua.(37) 
They had their origins in an amalgamation of the Khoikhoi chiefdom of Hinsati with the 
followers of Gandowentshaba, who had unsuccessfully challenged the succession of the 
Xhosa King, Tshiwo, in the late 17th century. Hinsati was at this time located in the 
area which was to become Bruyntjes Hoogte. (38) Gandowentshaba had sought sanctuary 
from Hinsati, but subsequently rejoined Tshiwo at the Bashee river, after the two had 
led a .joint attack on Hinsati's people and plundered their cattle. But some of Gandols 
Xhosa adherents remained behind in Hinsati's territory and others returned later. 
!!From the union of these Xhosa with Khoi emerged the Gonaqua chiefdom, under Cwama" (39), 
son of Hinsati and grandson of Gandowentshaba. Eighteenth century travellers often 
described the Gonaqua they met as. "a mixture of Hottentots and Caffres, as their 
language had an affinity with that of both these nationsn. (40) They were said to be 
taller and darkerskinned than the Khoikhoi and, according to Sparrman, they practised 
circumcision and were "in some sort tillers of the ground" (41), though Earinck 
disputes both these points. (42) 
The history of the Gonaqua in the early 18th century is obscure; it seems 
that they occupied extensive areas between the Fish and Kei rivers and were pushed 
back on the Keiskamma as the Xhosa moved westwards. By mid-century they had regrouped 
between the Fish and Keiskamma, where Beutler found them in 1752. (43) Hauptts account 
of relations between the Xhosa and Gonaqua (llvoor knegten en in oorlog tyden ook we1 
voor soldaten dienen") has been distorted by 20th century writers, notably by Maingard, 
who described the Gonaqua as being "in a state of virtual slaveryll. (44) Ruyter, the 
Hoengeyqua Captain, told Beutler that the Gonaquas llaltemaal onder de Caffers woonden 
en haar diendentl, but it seems that the relationship was in actuality far more complex. 
Intemwxiage was frequent, but Gonaqua communities appear to have retained a distinct 
identity; some were administered by Gonaqua, while others came under the influence of 
Xhosa dignitaries. (45) One such was Tshiwo's counsellor, Xhwane, whom tradition 
holds to be the founder of the Gqunukhwebe nation. (46) 
Beutler found the Khoikhoi c o d t i e s  to the west of the Gonaqua in a state 
of considerable disarray. Wars amongst themselves and with the San and Xhosa had 
reduced many to dependence on hunting and gathering. (47) Several of the old triba2 
names had fallen from use. However, Beutler identified three major groups on the 
south coast between the Gamtoos and Fish rivers: the Damasquas, between the Gamtoos 
and van Stadens rivers, the Damasonquas between the van Stadens river and the 
Zwartkops, and the Hoengeyquas under Ruyter (or   or ha) between the Bushmans and Fish 
rivers. It seems that the social disruption of the area had been caused by the 
eastwards retreat of Khoikhoi and San, who had been displaced by the advancing coloqy, 
as well as by periodic incursions of white stock thieves in the early 18th century (48) 
and by the westwards pressure of the Xhosa. (49) These troubled times were the 
forcing bed for the growth of the Hoengeyqua state under Ruyter, who is said to have 
come as a fugitive from the Roggeveld, where he had been in service. (50) Ruyter 
collected together 
a party of Boshies-men, or roaming Hottentots. At the 
head of these he subdued several other tribes, and 
afterwds had the art to make them take up ams against 
the Caffres, by exciting in them a high opinion of 
himself ... that they could not possibly do without 
him; especially as he supplied them with plunder, and 
taught them a method of rearing their cattle better 
in both cases than ever they had been accustomed to. (51) 
Ruyter himelf told Beutler that his territory extended from the land of the 
Damasonquas to the Keiskamma. (52) The Hoengeyqua appear to have held control of 
this area until the Gqunukhwebe, led by Shaka, crossed the Fish river in the 1760s. (53) 
Gqunukhwebe tradition holds that the Hoengeyqua agreed to their settlement in the 
Zuurveld, between the Fish and Kowie rivers, but Ruyterts descendants disputed this. (54) 
It seas rather that there followed a prolonged struggle between the two pups, in I 
which the Hoengeyqua were the eventual losers. Sparrman wmte in 1775 that Ruyter had I 
been much reduced by conflict with "the Caffres" and that his following had by then 
dwindled to "about 200 people" - "a less considerable and less free society". (55) 
Sparrman did not visit him, but on his map he showed llKoning Ruyterls kraal1I between 
the Fish and Bushmans rivers. !?he a&ed leader was at that time preparing another 
assault on his unnamed Xhosa enemies. (56) Almost certainly he was defeated, for in 
l776 Pieter Cloete found him living west of the Bushmans river with a group of 
Khoikhoi who called themselves Gonaquas, as well as a number of "Kaffir-Hottentot I 
bastards". (57) l I 
Thus the Khoikhoi east of the Gamtoos had been under peculiar pressure for 
some years before the permanent settlement of Europeans in their territories. This 
may partly explain the apparent lack of centrally directed resistance to colonial 
encroachment. Also, during the first decade of colonization, the effects of settler 
penetration were by no means uniform and probably strengthened the centrifugal forces 
i 
already in operation. 1 I 
In the early 1770s the Companyfs agents in Swellendam still rega.rded the 
Khoikhoi beyond their borders as a source of livestock independent of the colonists. 
This was in contrast to the situation in Swellendam itself, where "few or no 
Rottentots any longer reside in the kraals, but for the greater part with the 
 inhabitant^^^, who prevented them from bartering their cattle to the Compaqy. (58) But 
by the mid-1770s a number of Khoikhoi east of the Gamtoos were living, as individuals 
or in groups, on land claimed by the colonists. Some m w  have done so voluntarily (59) 
and this perhaps explains the distinction made in colonial correspondence between 
Khoikhoi living %ithU the Boers and those who belonged to them  i an Klaas of Salomon 
Ferreira . . . Snel of William Primloo", etc. ) . (60) At Gerrit Scheepers 1 S place, on 
the site later to be occupied by Uitenhage, Sparmnan found "a small society of 
Gunjemans Hottentots .. . [who] now lived on friendly term with the farmer above 
mentionedrt. (61) They were apparently not in service, and one of them, a widow, owned 
60 breeding cows. By 1776 Jacob van Reenen had acquired a loan-fazm on the lower 
Gamtoos, but the mouth of the river was reserved for the occupation of Khoikhoi, from 
whom the government bartered up to 300 cattle per aaum. (62) Scattered along the 
southern rivers were other groups who thus far had maintained a precarious independence. 
Near the ford on the Gamtoos lived Kees, who, with the approbation of the Swellendam 
authorities, "exercised control over half a hundred people" (63); a group of 
Damasquas and some 200 Gonaquas were found by Sparman on van Stadens river (64), and 
on the Little Sunda~.s river he met a clan of 1130ttentot-Caffrest~ who had "a great 
quantity of cattle". (65) 
The proximity of the settlers had, however, already introduced a number of 
less subtle pressures. In 1770 Joris, who had lived with Kees on the Gamtoos, was 
ordered to decamp with his people "as he had too m a q  cattle aud thus injured the 
pasture of the inhabitantstt. (66) In 1778 vaa Reenents lands were granted to one 
Hilgert Muller, a wealthy corn-farmer, a;nd Heemraad of Swellendam, and the Xhoikhoi 
at the mouth were evicted. Among them was Klaas Stuurman, foremost among the rebel 
leaders in 1799. (67) 
As the Colony closed in, it be that many Khoikhoi had little option 
but to accept terms of service. But the colonists were unwilling to wait. The 
practice of enslaving women and children was particularly marked on the north-eastern 
frontier, where Khoikhoi and San waged a guerilla war for nearly 40 years (68), but 
there is evidence that it occurred on the south coast as well. Sparrman met a 
pathetic group of elderly l~Boshiesmen" on the Lower Sundays river, who said that the 
farmers had been with them and carried off all their young people, and at the 
encampment on the Little Sundays he found a Khoikhoi servant who had captured three 
San women with their children and was taking them "home to his master for slavesW.(69) 
Even Ruyter appears to have collaborated in this business, perhaps because he sought 
support against the Gqunukhwebe. (70) 
At Bruyntjes Hoogte, the situation rapidly became far worse. It is not 
clear whether the Khoikhoi at Bruyntjes Hoogte in the 1770s were descendants of 
Hinsatils people. Sparmmn called them "Chinese Hottentots" - the Howouanas of 
Le Vaillantls Travels or d'Gauas to other Khoikhoi. (71) However, these people are 
usublly said to have lived in Camdebo, the Sneeuwbergen and further east around the 
Bamboesberg, and did not speak a Khoikhoi language, though they kept cattle. (72) 
In 1774 a correspondent from @er Bruyntjes Hoogte wrote of the poverty of the 
colonists there and added "there is here peace and quiet with the Hottentots". (73) 
However, one year later Sparrman depicted the "lazy and pleasant life" of the Boers 
in this division: 
With pleasure, but without the least trouble to himself, 
he sees the herds and flocks, which constitute his 
riches, daily and considerably increasing. These are 
driven to pasture and home again by a few Hottentots 
and slaves, who likewise make the butter; so that it 
is a-most only with the milking that the farmer, 
together with his wife and children, concern themselves 
at all. (74) 
As for the Hottentots, they had 
originally ... lived peaceably with the Christians ... 
They used likewise to perform the kindest services for 
the latter ... but at length they had withdrawn 
themselves, and now live concealed in holes and corners 
up and down this part of the country, like other 
Boshiesmen. Yet, being fewer in number, they are not 
altpgether so bold and daring. (75) 
Though one may wonder at the apparent suddenness of the transformation in relations 
between Boers and Khoikhoi, the general direction is clear: as the former increased 
in number and their herds became larger, their labour needs grew faster than the 
number of Khoikhoi who were willing or constrained by loss of stmck, pastures and 
w e ,  to enter their service. Thus, by 1775, some Khoikhoi in Bruyntjes Hoogte had 
already been made od serviceable slaves" and the others were in constant danger of 
meeting this fate.l1T6) Some m w  have fled northwards to join the d'Gauas between 
the Brak and White Kei rivers, but Boer commandos had begun to operate in this area, 
too, by the late 1770s. It is impossible to deal here with the conflict between 
settlers and Xhoisan on the north-eastern frontier - it seems that there were few, if 
any, organizational links between the robber bands of the north-east and the rebels 
of 1799. (77) But the contradictory mles of Khoisan servants in the northern 
conflict should be emphasized: those who accompanied their masters on raiding 
expeditions or were sent in their place greatly strengthened the commandos; those who 
deserted brou&t guns to the mountain bands. (78) 
The history of conflict between colonists and Xhosa prior to the rebellion 
is likewise too complex to be dealt with here, and has been discussed in depth 
elsewhere. (79) In sum, it can be said, first, that as white settlement spread 
eastwards after 1780 conflict over land was inevitably exacerbated. Its focus 
-thmughout this period was the Zuurveld, though by the mid-1790s some Boers in Agter 
Bruyntjes Hoogte had begun to abandon their farms. During the 1780s the number of 
loan-farms granted east of the Bushmans river increased rapidly. By Ma;y 1793 there 
were approximately 150 white families established in the Zuurveld. (80) The Xhosa 
population of the area ma;y also have increased following the drought of 1786, and 
thereafter the GqunuMnwebe were pushed westwards by Ndlambe and Langa. (81) The 
simmering conflict erupted in 1793: following an attack by a Boer commando, the 
Zuurveld Xhosa retaliated and the Boers fled west to the Zwartkops river. Some 
families returned, but white occupation of the Zuurveld was to remain precasious for 
a further 30 years. Second, it appears from the record of the conflict that the 
capture of Xhosa cattle was as important to the settlers as the acquisition of new 
pastures or the defence of old. (82) 
At this stage in the history of Graaff-Reinet (established as an 
administrative district in 1786) there can be little doubt that the increase in the 
number of white settlers and the slaves and stock they owned was, at least in part, 
a function of the development of new commercial opportunities at the Cape. 
The white population increased from 2,592 in 1788 to 3,108 in 1793 and 
3,937 in 1798 (83), surely faster than the natural rate of population increase in the 
Colony. Over the same period the number of male slaves more than doubled, as did the 
total slave population, yet by 1798 the average price of a male slave was between 400 
and 500 rix dollars (see A pendix 2). The figures for livestock are far less % reliable, but indicate a 4 OO/o increase in the number of cattle, and an increase in 
the number of sheep of about 33%. (84) It is at least noteworthy that the Boersl 
renewed ardour for commandos against the Xhosa manifested itself at a time (1789) when 
foreign shipping was again on the increase after a lull in the mid-1780s. On the 
other hand, the war of 1793 coincided with a severe depression at the Cape and 
attempts by the Company to enforce papnents of rent arrears in the interior. In 
October 1795 the burghers of Graaff-Reinet, who had ousted their Landdrost earlier 
that year, wrote to the new British administration explaining their quarrel with the 
former government. Surprisingly, they emphasized commercial problems rather than the 
unsettled state of the frontier. They complained of the low prices attendant on the 
monopolization of the meat market by the Company's contractors, of the prohibition on 
private trade with foreign ships and of the governmentls failure to exchange the 
depreciated paper currency in which they had been paid for base coinage. As a result, 
they complained "they1' had been forced to sell their fixed assets in order to buy 
their necessaries zYld were now threatened with insolvency. (85) The new government 
hastened to reassure them of its concern for their prosperity. Its concern was genuine; 
not only did it consider that the best chance of improving its revenues lay in 
fostering commerce (86), it was also well aware of the importance of Graaff-Reinett 
It may be necessary to observe that the district of 
Griaff Reinet is of the utmost value and importance 
to the Colony, as being the great Magazine .. . of 
cattle and sheep, from which we are almost entirely 
supplied. They would indeed have it in their power 
to starve us nearly, though, on the other hand, 
unless they reverted to a state of nature, it does 
not appear that they could themselves exist without 
a codcation with the Cape Town. (87) 
From 1795 to 1799 commercial prospects in the Colow as a whole were 
extremely favourable. Restrictions on internal trade were lifted immediately after 
the British took over, and from l!@' 1797 foreign neutrals were allowed to trade freely 
w i t h  the Cape, provided they did not infringe the monopoly of the British East India 
Company. The annua.1 average of ships was higher than in any previous five-yea 
period and the prices of most pastoral products more than doubled. (see Appendix 2.) 
By l800 there was a gaxrison of 5,000 men (88), whereas the total Company 
establishment in 1795 had barely exceeded 2,000. (89) In 1797 alone the squadron 
stationed at the Cape consumed 1,085,995 lbs. of fresh meat. (90) 
The manner in which these developments affected social relations in Graaff- 
Reinet is difficult to gauge with certainty at this stage. But Giliomee has shown 
that by 1798 considerable disparities of wealth had emerged among the colonists. Of 
972 llinhabitants", only 252 (26 per cent) held registered farms, and of these 174 held 
one, 62 held two, 14 held three, and 2 held four. (91) Together, "this 26% owned 
75.2% of the slaves, 56.6% of the cattle, 55.8% of the sheep, and 51.yh of the 
horses". (92) The remainder were owned mainly by landless kinsmen and bywoners, though 
some may have belonged to occupants of unregistered farms. Between 1,300 and 1,400 
Khoikhoi (males?) (93) owned 140 horses, 751 cattle and 30,557 sheep between them. (94) 
The animals were unequally distributed - a few individuals owned herds and flocks more 
than sufficient to support a family, while the majority did not. (95) 
It is surely fair to assume that the expansion of commerce brought with it 
intensified demands on Khoikhoi labour and that the increasing landlessness among 
whites indicated that by the late 18th century there were few places outside the 
already crowded areas of Xhosa settlement where Khoikhoi could maintain themselves as 
pastoralists independently of the Boers, had they been allowed. As early as 1775 
Sparrman had observed the deterioration of the veld in areas of white settlement, as 
a result of over-grazing, and by 1799 the game in the district was all but hunted 
out. (96) Nevertheless, many Khoikhoi did abscond from service. A common factor in 
the majority of desertions was the desire to escape from wretched conditions and 
violent treatment. hridence concerning the latter is so abundant as to convince the 
reader that, at least by the 1790s, relations between Boer masters and Khoikhoi 
servants in Graaff Reinet rested more upon violence, or the threat of it, than upon 
anything else. Indiscipline or negligence were often punished by flogging. (97) In 
April 1799 Barrow met a farmer near Algoa Bay who had kept a small boy in leeirons 
for 10 months because "he had alwags been a worthless boy; he had lost him so many 
sheep; he had slept when he ought to watch the cattle .. .". (98) The wives and 
children of Khoikhoi were forcibly prevented from leaving the farms - in 1794 the 
family and livestock of Ruyter's grandson were detained in this way by 
C. F. Bezuidenhout (99) - a.nd deserters, especially those who took with them their 
masters' guns, were sometimes shot or beaten to death. (100) 
In a situation so fraught with tension, it is difficult to distinguish 
cause from effect; but a number of general points can be made. On the one hand, 
unless one assumes with Barrow and Le Vaillant that the tyrannical conduct of the 
Boers was inherent in their character (101), one must locate the roots of their 
behaviour in those structural features which had produced forced labour and its 
attendant brutality in other colonies. In this case, although the colonists may, by 
the 11790s, have held a near monopoly of land in some parts of the district, Khoikhoi 
could, and did, find refuge among the Zuumreld Xhosa. Moreover, there was intense 
competition for servants among the Boers themselves - in 1798 Graaff-Reinet introduced 
a pass law to curb its effects. (102) On the other hand, had conditions of service 
been better, desertion might have been less frequent. In the absence of adequate data, 
it is impossible to make a sure assessment of these conditions. Some Khoikhoi must 
have been paid in' stock (103), yet in 1793 a number of Boers objected when the 
Khoikhoi who had served on commando against the Xhosa were each given one or two of 
the captured animals. (104) In the late 1780s, Maynier, then district secretary, had 
been accused by Landdrost Woeke of being "the 'ruin' of the Hottentots" because he 
paid them 12 rix dollars a year or more. (105) Barrow's evidence is contradictory: 
at one point he recorded that, unlike San captives, Xhoikhoi were paid wages, but 
elsewhere he wrote that they received "nothing but meat, tobacco and skins for their 
clothingn. (106) Clearly conditions varied with the bargaining power of the 
respective parties (107), but one may ask whether by the end of the century the 
expansion of commercial opportunities had not increased the reluctance of whites to 
allow Khoikhoi grazing ri&ts on their farms. (108) 
Las-tly, it is clear from the behaviour of some deserters that more was at 
issue than the conditions of service. In the case of many who took their masters1 
guns and horses and fled to the Xhosa (109), or collected together in bands in t,he 
woods and mountains (110), whence they plundered the settlers 1 herds and flocks, it 
was colonization itself which they resisted. Desertion to the Xhosa became frequent 
during the escalation of hostilities in the late 1790s and, despite the earlier 
animosity between the Hoengeyqua and the Gqunukhwebe, the fugitives were well 
received. (111) Duzing and after the w a r  of 1793 there were reports that Khoikhoi 
were "daily absconding" to join the Xhosa (112), and in 1794 it was suggested that 
"discontented Hottentots" rather than the Xhosa were the initiators of cattle thefts 
in the Zuurveld. (113) 
An indication of the extent of tension between masters and Khoikhoi servants 
by the end of the century can be found in the rumour of rebellion which agitated the 
constituted district government in 1795. Captain Kees, by then a prisoner at the Cape, 
was said to have escaped and to be preparing a colony-wide uprising in which all white 
males, except three, would be killed and their wives distributed among the 
victors. (114) Ilowever, the fragmented resistance of the 1790s did not erupt into 
full-scale rebellion until 1799, when the district authorities were in a state of 
chaos and the military weakness of the Boers was further exposed by their capitulation 
to a force of British dragoons and men of the Hottentot Corps. If the motives of 
deserters had been unclear in the 1790s, they became clear in 1799: 
'Restore', said S t u m ,  tthe country of which our 
fathers have been despoiled by the Dutch, and we 
have nothing more to ask. We lived very contentedly 
before these Dutch plunderers molested us, and why 
should we not do so again, if left to ourselves?f (115) 
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